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Abstract
There is a growing concern in recent years over the potential formation of
bubbles in the Chinese real estate market. This paper aims to conduct a series
of bubble diagnostic analysis over nine representative Chinese cities from two
aspects. First, we investigate whether the prices had been significantly de-
viating from economic fundamentals by applying a standard Engle-Granger
cointegration test. Second, we apply the Log-Periodic-Power-Law-Singularity
(LPPLS) model to detect whether there is any evidence of unsustainable,
self-reinforcing speculative behaviours amongst the price series. We propose
that, given the heterogeneity that exists amongst cities with different types
of bubble signatures, it is vital to conduct bubble diagnostic tests and im-
plement relevant policies toward specific bubble characteristics, rather than
enforcing one-that-fits-for-all type policy that does not take into account such
heterogeneity.
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1. Introduction
The Chinese housing market had experienced an unprecedented boom
since 2008. According to Fig. 1, the price in Shenzhen had nearly quadrupled
from Jan/2008 to Jun/2017. Beijing and Shanghai had grown by nearly three
times over the recent decade. Some cities outside the Tier-1 category also
had a remarkable growth. While some analysts were concerned, posing dire
warnings of the imminent collapse of the Chinese housing market, others
reject the bubble hypothesis, finding justifications of the booming real estate
market in terms of the rapid pace of urbanization and other social factors
such as the cultural urge to hold real estates (Ahuja et al., 2010).
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Figure 1: Residential real estate prices (Y uan/m2) in China from Jan/2008 to Jun/2017.
There is a significant rise in most Tier-1 cities, while prices of Tier-2 and Tier-3 cities had
grown more moderately. Source: WIND Database
In order to gain an insight on the recent housing boom in China, one
needs to trace back to the aftermath of 2007 Global Financial Crisis (GFC).
In November 2008, the Chinese government had announced a 4-trillion in-
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vestment package that aims to stimulate domestic economy1. Despite a brief
period of accelerating growth, the real sector had continued to slow down
according to Fig. 2. The slowdown is particularly noticeable in the Li Ke-
qiang index - an alternative measurement of macroeconomic performance2.
On the other hand, the credit sector had become increasingly lenient toward
household borrowing. According to Fig. 3, we observe a rapid growth in
medium-to-long-term household borrowing, with a steady decrease of inter-
est rates (upper panel). There is also a dramatic rise in terms of the elasticity
of Personal Housing Loan (PHL) relative to GDP3, as well as the proportion
of PHL relative to the total amount of loans in the Big-4 Chinese banks4
(lower panel). The traditional cultural urge to hold real estate, accompanied
by a lack of alternative investment channels since the stock market crash in
2008 and 2015, had prompted households to participate even more aggres-
sively in the spending spree over housing while giving banks further incentives
to lend to households. The increasing level of financial fragility associated
with the over-heating housing market had raised concerns of the central gov-
ernment. In the official newspaper People’s daily (Ren Min Ri Bao), the
potential danger of a real estate bust was, for the first time, referred to as
a “grey rhino”5, alluding to extreme events in large probability instead of a
lower-probability Talebic “black swan” (Taleb, 2007). A series of purchasing
restrictions was issued as early as 2010 in order to curb the over-heating mar-
1The package aims to assist ten key sectors, encompassing housing, rural infrastructure,
transportation, health and education, environment, industry, disaster rebuilding, income-
building, tax cuts, and finance. It was further announced that the central government
provides only a quarter of the total package, with the rest three quarters being allocated
by the budgets of the local and provincial governments through bank lending (citation).
2The Li Keqiang index was coined by The Economist magazine to measure China’s
economic performance in terms of three aspects: the railway cargo volume, electricity
consumption and loans disbursed by banks. It is widely cited as an alternative economic
barometer compared to the official GDP figure (Economist, 2010).
3The elasticity is defined as PHL%/GDP%, which measures the percentage change
of PHL relative to 1% growth of GDP. Similarly, we also calculate the elasticity of Real
Estate Development (RED) Loans as well as the Commercial Real Estate (CRE) loans
relative to GDP in Fig. 3.
4The Big-4 Chinese banks are Bank of China (BOC), China Construction Bank (CCB),
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), and Agricultural Bank of China (ABC).
5See Wucker (2016): The Gray Rhino: How to Recognize and Act on the Obvious
Dangers We Ignore.
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ket6. Lugovskyy et al. (2014) conduct an experimental study on the efficacy
of such asset holding caps and argue that such policy would be effective in
eliminating bubbles if it is properly designed.
Unlike other breeds of speculative bubbles, the burst of a real-estate bub-
ble could potentially engender far-reaching consequence due to the deep in-
volvement of banking sector. Historically, the burst of Japanese real-estate
bubble in the late 1980s had led the country into a decades-long recession
that hasn’t yet recovered to date. The full ramification of the latest sub-
prime mortgage crisis in the US and the subsequent global contagion is still
yet to be seen. In order to avoid systemic financial crisis and the ensuing
economic depression, it is vital to conduct ex-ante bubble diagnosis and pro-
vide well-informed policy guidance that aims to curb bubbles at its formative
stage prior to the critical point.
As is pointed out by Case and Shiller (2003), the term “bubble” is widely
used but rarely clearly defined. Amongst existing studies, bubble is com-
monly referred to as a temporary deviation of price from its fundamental
value. There are generally two strands of literature in the study of housing
bubbles from such a fundamental approach. The first strand applies the idea
of user-cost model of Poterba (1984), which usually takes housing rent as a
proxy of future cash flows and derives the equilibrium price of real estates
based on non-arbitrage condition and efficient market hypothesis (Gallin,
2006; Hoffmann et al., 2012). The second strand studies the long-term re-
lationship between housing prices and the underlying economic fundamen-
tals. A cointegration model is generally applied and bubble is identified
if there is no cointegration between housing prices and fundamental factors
(Hui and Yue, 2006; Mikhed and Zemcik, 2007; Arshanapalli and Nelson, 2008).
Yet the fundamental definition of bubble does not capture the inher-
ent non-linear dynamics of bubble formation process that drives the bub-
ble. From a Minskyan point of view, bubbles are inherently unstable due to
bounded rationality of investors (Minsky, 1975). Kindleberger (1989) anato-
mized a typical financial bubble in five distinct phases: displacement, credit
expansion, euphoria, overtrading, and revulsion. Hence, in addition to the
fundamental definition of bubbles, we cannot overlook the speculative na-
6the Guo-Shi-Tiao was announced and implemented in Tier-1 cities in Apr/2010, stat-
ing that one family can only purchase one apartment. The policy was further extended to
other major Chinese cities in the subsequent five years.
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ture of a bubble driven by herd behaviour and aggravated by drastic credit
expansion and self-reinforcing positive feedback mechanism. Such unsus-
tainable price trajectory is often characterized by a faster-than-exponential
growth in asset price during the bubble formation process prior to its burst.
This is mathematically formalized by Sornette (2003) in the development
of Log-Periodic-Power-Law-Singularity (LPPLS) model. The LPPLS frame-
work had made a remarkable track record in early diagnosis of bubbles as
well as post-mortem analysis of historical bubbles. Sornette and Zhou (2004)
studies the 2000 new economy bubble. Zhou and Sornette (2006) examines
the US Real-Estate Bubble. Jiang et al. (2010) conducted a bubble diag-
nosis of 2005-2007 and 2008-2009 Chinese stock market bubbles. More re-
cently, Zhang et al. (2017) investigate the critical transitions of Chinese real
estate bubbles based on the LPPLS framework. From a laboratory setting,
Himmelberg et al. (2005) conduct a controlled price formation experiment,
which detects the existence of super-exponential bubble due to positive feed-
back.
This paper aims to conduct a series of bubble diagnostic analysis over nine
representative Chinese cities from two aspects. First, we investigate whether
the prices had been significantly deviating from economic fundamentals by
applying a standard Engle-Granger cointegration test. Second, we apply
the Log-Periodic-Power-Law-Singularity (LPPLS) model to detect whether
there is any evidence of unsustainable, self-reinforcing speculative behaviours
amongst the univariate price series. We differ from Zhang et al. (2017) in
two aspects. First, a conventional cointegration analysis is incorporated in
comparison to the LPPLS analysis. Second, we focus on diagnosing the
LPPLS signals based on the filter condition instead of the critical time (tc).
On the policy side, we argue that it is vital to conduct bubble diagnostic test
in order to identify whether bubbles are fundamental-driven or speculative-
driven, and design policies that address the specific bubble signatures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the
methodological framework of bubble diagnosis from both fundamental and
LPPLS perspectives. Section 3 describes the data and defines the variables
used in this study. Section 4 provides the empirical results. Finally, section
5 concludes.
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2. Methodology
2.1. The Fundamental Diagnosis of Bubbles: Pairwise Engle-Granger Ap-
proach
We apply a simple pairwise cointegration model of Engle and Granger
(1987) to investigate whether there is any long-run relationship between
housing prices and its corresponding fundamental factors. Suppose there
are two non-stationary series Xt and Yt that are integrated of order one
I(1). If certain linear combination of Xt and Yt yields I(0), then we say that
Xt and Yt are cointegrated. The Engle-Granger cointegration test is sim-
ply done in two steps: first, we conduct the Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF)
test7 to see if all series are I(1). Second, we run a simple OLS regression
of Yt = β0 + β1t + β2Xt + ut and test if ut is I(0). In the context of this
paper, a fundamental bubble exists if (i) the price series are not I(0), and
(ii) the fundamental factors are I(0), or the I(1) fundamental factor is not
cointegrated with I(1) price series.
2.2. The Log-Periodic-Power-Law-Singularity (LPPLS) Diagnosis of Bubbles
We further apply the LPPLS framework proposed by Sornette (2003) in
order to examine whether the housing prices contain any sign of unsustainable
speculative component characterized by faster-than-exponential growth pat-
tern due to herd-behaviour and positive feedback mechanism, coupled with
a periodic oscillation dynamics due to heterogeneous interactions between
fundamentalists and trend chasers. Hence we apply the Johansen-Ledoit-
Sornette (JLS) model, of which the law of motion takes the following form:
dp
p
= µ(t)dt+ σ(t)dW − κdj, (1)
where µ(t) is the drift and σ(t) is the diffusion component of a standard
Wiener process augmented by a discontinuous jump dj with the dummy
switch j = 0 prior to the critical time and j = 1 after the crash. We further
define the crash hazard rate h(t), which is proportional to the expectation
of dj: h(t) = E[dj]/dt. By applying the rational expectation condition of
Blanchard and Watson (1982), we obtain
µ(t) = κh(t). (2)
7See Dickey and Fuller (1979).
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According to Sornette (2003), the hazard rate takes the following form:
h(t) = α(tc − t)m−1(1 + βcos(ω ln(tc − t)− φ′), (3)
Eq. (3) consists of a component of power law singularity due to self-
reinforcing herd behaviour of noise traders α(tc−t)m−1, as well as an oscillat-
ing component β cos(ω ln(tc−t)−ψ′) driven by the heterogeneous interactions
between fundamentalists and trend chasers. The power-law singularity cap-
tures the positive feedback mechanism driven by the self-reinforcing beliefs
while the log-periodicity embodies the tug-of-war between the two types of
investors leading to large scale volatility leading to the singularity, or critical
time (tc). Combining (1 - 3) yields
E[lnp(t)] = A+B(tc − t)m + C(tc − t)m cos[ω ln(tc − t)− φ], (4)
with B = −κα/m and C = −καβ/√m2 + ω2. Generally, the bubble regimes
are conditioned by 0 < m < 1 and B < 0, wherem < 1 insures the singularity
- the expected log-price diverges at tc and the two conditions combined insure
that the price grows super-exponentially towards the critical time tc.
Given its non-linear structure, the conventional method of calibrating
Equation (4) follows a two-step process. The first step involves a taboo search
of Cvijovic and Klinowski (1995) to find N number of candidate solutions
from our given search space. Each of these solutions is used as an initial
estimates in a Levenberg-Marquardt non-linear least squares algorithm. We
take the solution with the minimum sum of squares of the residuals. This
paper adopts the procedure proposed by Filimonov and Sornette (2013) and
Sornette et al. (2015) where the number of non-linear parameters has been
reduced to just 3: tc, m, ω for parsimonious purpose. The filter condition is
given by Sornette et al. (2015) below:
0.01 ≤ m ≤ 0.99 (5)
2 ≤ ω ≤ 25 (6)
t2 − 0.05dt ≤ tc ≤ t2 + 0.1dt (7)
2.5 ≤ ω
2pi
ln[
tc − t1
tc − t2 ] (8)
1 ≤ |mB/ωC| (9)
In the context of this paper, if all filter conditions above are met, we define
a bubble in the corresponding series. We set the start time at t1 = 200801,
then move forward on a monthly basis until t1 = 201010. The end time t2
fixed at t2 = 201705.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of residential housing prices (Y uan/m2) in Tier-1 cities:
Jan/2008-Jun/2017. Source: WIND Database
Price Statistic Beijing Shanghai Guangzhou Shenzhen
Mean 23234.07 21165.75 13604.13 25953.03
Median 22323.50 17089.00 13916.00 20865.00
Maximum 46834.00 50401.00 17882.00 61756.00
Minimum 10486.38 7510.870 7977.821 10770.00
3. Data Description
Our data is collected from WIND and National Bureau of Statistic from
Jan-2008 to Jun-2017 on a monthly basis8. We have chosen nine repre-
sentative cities, which include the four Tier-1 cities, as well as five Tier
2&3 cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Hangzhou,
Chengdu, Wuxi, and Zhengzhou. We take the average price of traded resi-
dential building (Y uan/m2) as a proxy for housing market condition (Pcity).
In addition, regional GDP (GDPcity), disposable income of urban residents
(INCcity), and urban population of the respective cities (POPcity) are chosen
as a measurement of fundamentals9. Furthermore, in order to analyse how
credit factors influences the housing price dynamics, we take provident fund10
interest rate of individual housing loans (IRH), broad money (M2), as well
as medium & long-term new RMB loans (NRLH) granted to households
(> 5years). The descriptive statistics of housing prices for Tier-1 cities and
the representative Tier-2&3 cities are presented in Table 1 and Table 2.
4. Results
4.1. Are housing prices deviating from economic fundamentals in the long
run?
In this subsection, we examine whether housing prices are significantly
derailed from the selected fundamental factors. We include three macro-
8A database that provides comprehensive information on Chinese economy. URL:
http://www.wind.com.cn/en/default.html
9The data is rearranged into monthly frequency by WIND. Monthly X-12 algorithm is
also applied to eliminate seasonal effects in the series
10It is a type of investment fund (especially in SE Asia) contributed to by employ-
ees, employers, and (sometimes) the state, out of which a lump sum is provided to each
employee on retirement.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of residential housing prices (Y uan/m2) for 5 representative
cities outside Tier-1 category: Jan/2008-Jun/2017 Source: WIND Database
Price Statistic Tianjin Hangzhou Chengdu Wuxi Zhengzhou
Mean 10199.36 17012.28 8870.815 7729.790 6853.389
Median 9998.000 16289.50 8881.000 7853.558 6789.000
Maximum 17366.00 28214.00 14447.00 10591.94 10538.00
Minimum 6470.760 11382.54 5336.630 4668.800 3771.000
variables on a regional basis, i.e. GDP, income per capita, and population of
each representative cities. We first run a standard ADF test with constant
and trend to examine whether the prices series and fundamental factors are
stationary. If any price series is stationary, it indicates a self-correcting prop-
erty in the series, hence no bubble. Table 3 reports the main result of our
analysis. As for the price series, we found that all the prices are integrated of
order 1 except Guangzhou. As for the macro-variables, we found that all the
regional GDP series are non-stationary, yet for income per capita (INC ) and
population (POP), INC of Hangzhou, Wuxi, and Zhengzhou, as well as POP
of Beijing and Wuxi are integrated of order zero (I(0)). We further conduct
the Engle-Granger test to analyze whether the I(1) price series are cointe-
grated with the I(1) fundamentals. Generally, there are no clear sign of such
cointegration except for Shanghai, where GDP is cointegrated with price at
5% LOS and INC at 10% LOS. Yet there is no evidence of cointegration
between PShanghai and POPShanghai. Overall, from this preliminary analysis,
we conclude that only Guangzhou is excluded from the bubble hypothesis
from the fundamental perspective.
4.2. Is there unsustainable speculation in the housing market?
As pointed out by Kindleberger (1989), the bounded rationality of in-
vestors plays a pivotal role in the formation of speculative bubble. Fur-
thermore, the endogenous nature of credit expansion renders such leveraged
speculation possible. Such unsustainable, self-reinforcing bubble is often as-
sociated with an inherent relationship between asset prices and the underly-
ing financial factors, and characterized by a faster-than-exponential growth
component of price series, which is mathematically formalized by Sornette
(2003) in the development of Log-Periodic-Power-Law-Singularity (LPPLS)
model.
We begin with investigating whether there is any long-run relationship
between housing prices and the underlying credit factors in a similar pairwise
9
Table 3: Engle-Granger diagnosis with fundamental factors. We denote residential housing
price (Y uan/m2) of city x as Px, per capita income of city x as INCx, and urban popula-
tion of city x as POPx. It is found that PGuangzhou, POPBeijing , INCHangzhou, INCWuxi,
POPWuxi, and INCZhengzhou are I(0) while the rest of variables I(1). Guangzhou is ex-
cluded from the test since PGuangzhou is stationary. For other cities, a bubble exists since
there is at least one fundamental factor that is not cointegrated with price series.
Cities GDP INC POP
Beijing -1.54091 -1.55562 N/A
(0.8076) (0.8021) N/A
Shanghai -3.64674 -3.26836 -1.73829
(0.0317)⋆⋆ (0.0786)⋆ (0.7256)
Guangzhou N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A
Shenzhen -2.23465 -0.13013 -1.3957
(0.4644) (0.9936) (0.8555)
Tianjin -2.08396 -3.43469 -1.84866
(0.547) (0.0535) (0.6721)
Hangzhou -2.72684 N/A -2.81171
(0.2288) N/A (0.1973)
Chengdu -1.39695 -1.48165 -1.32539
(0.8552) (0.8285) (0.8749)
Wuxi -0.91553 N/A N/A
(0.9489) N/A N/A
Zhengzhou -2.59795 N/A -3.06301
(0.2824) N/A (0.1219)
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Table 4: Pairwise Engle-Granger test for real estate prices against financial variables.
We denote New RMB Loans for Households as NRLH , Interest Rate for Households as
IRH , and Broad Money as M2. There is a long-run relationship between housing prices
and the underlying credit factors in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Hangzhou, and
Zhengzhou. The evidence is particularly strong in terms of NRLH .
Cities NRLH IRH M2
Beijing −2.782645 −1.261070 −1.400137
(0.06501)⋆ (0.6443) (0.9794)
Shanghai −2.939178 −2.143475 −3.021259
(0.0451)⋆⋆ (0.2285) (0.0369)⋆⋆
Guangzhou N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A
Shenzhen −4.528026 −2.242361 −1.891156
(0.0004)⋆⋆⋆ (0.1932) (0.3350)
Tianjin −3.384025 −2.353078 −3.208008
(0.0142)⋆⋆ (0.1582) (0.0229)⋆⋆
Hangzhou −3.275892 −3.241492 −2.762250
(0.0191)⋆⋆ (0.0210)⋆⋆ (0.0681)⋆
Chengdu −2.500844 −1.859283 −1.813710
(0.1189) (0.3499) (0.3706)
Wuxi −1.327366 −0.798439 −0.837302
(0.6136) (0.8143) (0.8031)
Zhengzhou −3.136173 −3.173356 −3.209019
(0.0276)⋆⋆ (0.0250)⋆⋆ (0.0228)⋆⋆
cointegration model. Three financial variables are selected, i.e. new RMB
loans to households over five-years term (NRLH), provident fund interest
rates of households (IRH), and broad money (M2). From the ADF tests,
we found that all the three factors are I(1). We further conduct a EG test
between housing prices and the three financial factors, as is shown in Table
4. The result is generally in line with Xu and Chen (2012). It is evident that
bank lending to household is strongly associated with the long-term surge of
housing prices amongst most cities, as reflected in the cointegration between
Px and NRLH in the sample. The relationship is relatively weaker in M2
and IRH .
We further apply the LPPLS framework to diagnose whether the housing
prices contain faster-than-exponential components according to Jiang et al.
(2010), as shown in Table 5. The LPPLS strength here is defined as the
proportion of windows with LPPLS signature over the total number of win-
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Table 5: Occurrence of Log-Periodic-Power-Law-Singularity (LPPLS) Signals. There is
evidence of LPPLS signatures in Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin, and Chengdu.
LPPLS Diagnosis LPPLS Strength
Beijing N 0%
Shanghai Y 100%
Guangzhou N 0%
Shenzhen Y 5.89%
Tianjin Y 5.89%
Hangzhou N 0%
Chengdu Y 17.65%
Wuxi N 0%
Zhengzhou N 0%
dows11. We found four cities that exhibit signs of faster-than-exponential
growth component, i.e. Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin, and Chengdu. The
LPPLS strength is particularly strong in Shanghai, of which all time win-
dows are diagnosed with positive LPPLS signals. Surprisingly, Chengdu has
a moderate level of LPPLS signal, despite the absence of relationship between
PChengdu and the underlying financial factors. It indicates that the housing
price in Chengdu is likely to be driven by non-financial speculative factors.
Shenzhen and Tianjin had shared a similar degree of LPPLS strength, al-
though the housing price in Shenzhen is much higher in absolute terms.
Overall, we conclude that amongst the nine cities being examined, only
Guangzhou does not exhibit clear signs of bubble due to its stationary prop-
erty and absence of LPPLS signature, as summarized in Table 6. The result
is generally in line with Zhang et al. (2017), which diagnosed an imminent
high risk of turning point or correction in Beijing, Tianjin and Chengdu
in 2017 while Shanghai and Shenzhen are at high risk in 2018 in terms of
the quantile-based DS-LPPLS Confidence indicator. Similarly, there is no
evidence of bubble in Guangzhou according to this previous study.
It is evident from the empirical analysis above that the purchase & credit
restrictions enforced since April 2010 had by and large failed to curb excessive
growth of housing prices, despite the strenuous effort of the central govern-
ment. This is in contrast with Lugovskyy et al. (2014), which argues from
a laboratory setting that such asset holding caps could be effective if it is
11We fix t2 = 201705 and vary t1 on a monthly basis from t1 = 200801 to t
′
1
= 201010.
Hence we have a total number of 34 windows.
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Table 6: Summary of Results: Engle-Granger (EG) vs. Log-Periodic-Power-Law-
Singularity (LPPLS) Diagnosis. Only Guangzhou does not exhibit a clear bubble signature
amongst the nine cities being examined.
EG LPPLS Overall
Beijing Y N Y
Shanghai Y Y Y
Guangzhou N N N
Shenzhen Y Y Y
Tianjin Y Y Y
Hangzhou Y N Y
Chengdu Y Y Y
Wuxi Y N Y
Zhengzhou Y N Y
well designed. Yet since 2017, the Chinese authority had announced another
series of unconventional policies. In early 2017, a new policy named selling
restriction (Xian-Mai) was implemented in 14 cities, which prohibits real es-
tate buyers and investors to sell within a period of time that ranges from 2
years to 5 years. This policy had provided an efficient means to drive away
short-term, speculative investors meanwhile preventing large-scale stampede
from real estate markets that would eventually result in a crash. We recom-
mend that, in order to design effective policy, it is vital to conduct bubble
diagnostic test and implement relevant policies in cities with specific bubble
signatures. For cities with significant LPPLS signature, it is vital to de-
sign policies that aim to eliminate excessive expectations on housing prices
beyond mere demand-side control. For example, the selling constraint men-
tioned above would effectively eliminate the short-term speculative investors,
thus stabilizing the price. Yet for cities that are diagnosed with fundamental
bubbles without LPPLS signature, it would be more appropriate to design
supply-side policies that accommodate the demand pressure arising from eco-
nomic fundamentals.
5. Conclusion
The Chinese housing market had sustained a rapid growth since 2008,
which is in stark contrast with the gloomy outlook of global economy and
the steady decline of domestic real sector since the aftermath of 2007 GFC.
It had raised concerns of both academics and policy makers alike.
This paper aims to provide an informed test over the bubble hypothesis
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of Chinese housing market based on nine representative cities. Our study
differs from previous ones in the sense that we incorporate not only a con-
ventional bubble definition from a fundamental perspective by means of a
cointegration model, but also from a behavioural perspective of the emerg-
ing LPPLS framework to detect whether there is any unsustainable traits in
the price dynamics characterized by faster-than-exponential growth signals.
We found that amongst the nine cities being examined, only Guangzhou does
not exhibit a clear sign of bubble.
On the policy side, we suggest that the conventional purchase & credit
restrictions haven’t had the desired effect in curbing excessive increase of
housing prices amongst the sample being examined. Given the heterogene-
ity that exists amongst cities with distinct bubble signatures, it is vital to
conduct bubble diagnostic tests and implement relevant policies toward the
specific bubble characteristics, rather than enforcing one-that-fits-for-all type
policy that does not take into account such heterogeneity. We propose that,
for cities with significant LPPLS signature, it is vital to implement policies
that aim to eliminate speculative demand. In cities without LPPLS signa-
ture, the supply-side policies would be more appropriate in addressing the
pressure arising from fundamental demand. The implications of such bubble
diagnostic test toward a wider range of cities, as well as the efficacy of current
policies will be further investigated in future research.
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Appendix: Selected LPPLS outputs for cities with positive signals12.
Table .7: LPPLS Output: Shanghai
t1 tc m w A B C Bm/Cw IndLPPLS
200801 201705 0.746 4.245 10.883 -0.004 0.001 1.438 1
200802 201705 0.74 4.247 10.89 -0.005 0.001 1.45 1
200803 201705 0.713 4.251 10.923 -0.006 0.001 1.51 1
200804 201705 0.712 4.247 10.923 -0.006 0.001 1.513 1
200805 201705 0.747 4.267 10.883 -0.004 0.001 1.43 1
200806 201705 0.75 4.289 10.882 -0.004 0.001 1.412 1
200807 201705 0.776 4.393 10.867 -0.004 0 1.317 1
200808 201705 0.779 4.402 10.866 -0.003 0 1.309 1
200809 201705 0.781 4.408 10.865 -0.003 0 1.303 1
200810 201705 0.775 4.384 10.868 -0.004 0 1.323 1
200811 201705 0.765 4.332 10.872 -0.004 0.001 1.356 1
200812 201705 0.763 4.316 10.873 -0.004 0.001 1.365 1
200901 201705 0.751 4.228 10.879 -0.004 0.001 1.408 1
200902 201705 0.748 4.186 10.88 -0.004 0.001 1.424 1
200903 201705 0.716 4.086 10.912 -0.006 0.001 1.484 1
200904 201705 0.708 3.947 10.912 -0.006 0.001 1.511 1
200905 201705 0.703 3.839 10.911 -0.006 0.001 1.523 1
200906 201705 0.7 3.77 10.91 -0.006 0.001 1.526 1
200907 201705 0.702 3.824 10.911 -0.006 0.001 1.525 1
200908 201705 0.707 3.913 10.912 -0.006 0.001 1.523 1
200909 201705 0.715 4.07 10.913 -0.006 0.001 1.515 1
200910 201705 0.721 4.159 10.913 -0.005 0.001 1.508 1
200911 201705 0.715 4.067 10.913 -0.006 0.001 1.513 1
200912 201705 0.751 4.263 10.882 -0.004 0.001 1.477 1
201001 201705 0.762 4.429 10.88 -0.004 0 1.454 1
201002 201705 0.768 4.482 10.878 -0.004 0 1.443 1
201003 201705 0.767 4.468 10.878 -0.004 0 1.445 1
201004 201705 0.774 4.553 10.877 -0.004 0 1.435 1
201005 201705 0.806 4.878 10.868 -0.003 0 1.365 1
201006 201705 0.805 4.867 10.869 -0.003 0 1.368 1
201007 201705 0.793 4.756 10.872 -0.003 0 1.389 1
201008 201705 0.768 4.499 10.877 -0.004 0 1.393 1
201009 201705 0.763 4.447 10.878 -0.004 0 1.386 1
201010 201705 0.785 4.669 10.874 -0.003 0 1.413 1
12LPPLS filter rule: IndLPPLS = 1 if 0.01 ≤ m ≤ 0.99, 2 ≤ ω ≤ 25, t2 − 0.05dt ≤
tc ≤ t2 + 0.1dt, 2.5 ≤ ω2π ln[ tc−t1tc−t2 ], and 1 ≤ |mB/ωC|, indicating a bubble exists in the
corresponding time series. Otherwise IndLPPLS = 0, indicating no evidence of LPPLS
bubble.
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Table .8: LPPLS Output: Shenzhen
t1 tc m w A B C Bm/Cw IndLPPLS
200801 201709 0.799 3.172 11.224 -0.003 0.001 1.054 1
200802 201709 0.879 3.142 11.172 -0.002 0 1.038 1
200803 201709 1 3.089 11.112 -0.001 0 1.024 0
200804 201709 1 3.126 11.114 -0.001 0 1.011 0
200805 201709 1 3.136 11.115 -0.001 0 1.007 0
200806 201709 1 3.126 11.114 -0.001 0 1.011 0
200807 201709 1 3.138 11.115 -0.001 0 1.007 0
200808 201709 1 3.196 11.118 -0.001 0 0.988 0
200809 201709 1 3.232 11.12 -0.001 0 0.977 0
200810 201709 1 3.237 11.121 -0.001 0 0.975 0
200811 201709 1 3.241 11.121 -0.001 0 0.974 0
200812 201709 1 3.254 11.122 -0.001 0 0.971 0
200901 201709 1 3.215 11.119 -0.001 0 0.98 0
200902 201709 1 3.173 11.116 -0.001 0 0.99 0
200903 201709 1 3.098 11.111 -0.001 0 1.003 0
200904 201708 1 2.946 11.097 -0.001 0 1.019 0
200905 201707 1 2.769 11.078 -0.001 0 1.032 0
200906 201707 0 2.192 166070.8 -166058 0.262 0.626 0
200907 201707 0 2.233 155980.8 -155968 0.265 0.608 0
200908 201707 0 2.261 151409.9 -151397 0.27 0.588 0
200909 201707 0 2.265 217427 -217414 0.271 0.585 0
200910 201707 0 2.276 72515.84 -72503 0.273 0.578 0
200911 201707 0 2.27 118581.4 -118569 0.272 0.581 0
200912 201707 0 2.275 100781.6 -100769 0.273 0.579 0
201001 201707 0 2.267 189005.6 -188993 0.272 0.582 0
201002 201707 0 2.243 118439.3 -118426 0.271 0.588 0
201003 201707 0 2.203 188795.2 -188782 0.27 0.595 0
201004 201707 0 2.192 105828.1 -105815 0.27 0.596 0
201005 201707 0 2.178 132157.1 -132144 0.27 0.597 0
201006 201707 0 2.174 176746.1 -176733 0.27 0.597 0
201007 201707 0 2.213 255119.7 -255107 0.269 0.596 0
201008 201707 0 2.233 162061.7 -162049 0.269 0.594 0
201009 201707 0 2.235 300033.9 -300021 0.269 0.594 0
201010 201707 0 2.225 125547.9 -125535 0.269 0.595 0
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Table .9: LPPLS Output: Tianjin
t1 tc m w A B C Bm/Cw IndLPPLS
200801 201706 0.659 2.227 9.797 -0.005 0.001 1.29 1
200802 201706 0.71 2.121 9.777 -0.004 0.001 1.292 1
200803 201705 0.801 1.953 9.753 -0.002 0.001 1.296 0
200804 201705 0.991 1.658 9.727 -0.001 0 1.327 0
200805 201705 1 1.677 9.727 0 0 1.309 0
200806 201705 1 1.727 9.728 0 0 1.278 0
200807 201705 1 1.769 9.729 0 0 1.254 0
200808 201705 1 1.789 9.729 0 0 1.244 0
200809 201705 1 1.815 9.73 0 0 1.23 0
200810 201705 1 1.833 9.731 0 0 1.221 0
200811 201705 1 1.82 9.73 0 0 1.228 0
200812 201705 1 1.81 9.73 0 0 1.232 0
200901 201705 1 1.815 9.73 0 0 1.23 0
200902 201705 1 1.815 9.73 0 0 1.23 0
200903 201705 1 1.787 9.729 0 0 1.244 0
200904 201705 1 1.738 9.728 0 0 1.269 0
200905 201705 1 1.686 9.728 0 0 1.296 0
200906 201705 1 1.641 9.727 0 0 1.321 0
200907 201705 1 1.567 9.726 0 0 1.363 0
200908 201705 1 1.55 9.726 0 0 1.373 0
200909 201705 1 1.523 9.726 0 0 1.388 0
200910 201705 0.882 1.633 9.736 -0.001 0 1.389 0
200911 201705 0.816 1.69 9.744 -0.002 0.001 1.404 0
200912 201705 0.719 1.767 9.761 -0.003 0.001 1.45 0
201001 201705 0.663 1.798 9.775 -0.005 0.001 1.492 0
201002 201705 0.681 1.793 9.77 -0.004 0.001 1.476 0
201003 201705 0.679 1.793 9.771 -0.004 0.001 1.479 0
201004 201705 0.707 1.783 9.764 -0.004 0.001 1.456 0
201005 201705 0.762 1.754 9.753 -0.002 0.001 1.423 0
201006 201705 0 0.698 47912.66 -47903 0.237 0.203 0
201007 201705 0 0.71 46551.48 -46541.9 0.239 0.183 0
201008 201705 0 0.708 23253.06 -23243.4 0.239 0.186 0
201009 201705 0 0.712 13937.11 -13927.5 0.239 0.18 0
201010 201705 0.759 1.776 9.755 -0.002 0.001 1.422 0
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Table .10: LPPLS Output: Chengdu
t1 tc m w A B C Bm/Cw IndLPPLS
200801 201709 0.92 10.553 9.483 0 0 0.419 0
200802 201709 0.926 10.491 9.482 0 0 0.429 0
200803 201706 0.61 2.451 9.648 -0.007 0.002 1.036 1
200804 201705 0.68 2.261 9.62 -0.004 0.001 1.081 1
200805 201705 0.757 2.077 9.599 -0.002 0.001 1.126 1
200806 201705 0.864 1.832 9.578 -0.001 0 1.189 0
200807 201705 0.916 1.737 9.575 -0.001 0 1.218 0
200808 201705 0.981 1.623 9.574 -0.001 0 1.259 0
200809 201705 1 1.604 9.575 -0.001 0 1.258 0
200810 201705 1 1.625 9.576 -0.001 0 1.237 0
200811 201705 1 1.642 9.577 -0.001 0 1.221 0
200812 201705 1 1.652 9.577 -0.001 0 1.211 0
200901 201705 1 1.658 9.577 -0.001 0 1.206 0
200902 201705 1 1.659 9.577 -0.001 0 1.206 0
200903 201705 1 1.65 9.577 -0.001 0 1.213 0
200904 201705 1 1.636 9.577 -0.001 0 1.225 0
200905 201705 1 1.617 9.576 -0.001 0 1.241 0
200906 201705 1 1.59 9.576 -0.001 0 1.262 0
200907 201705 1 1.567 9.576 -0.001 0 1.28 0
200908 201705 1 1.553 9.576 -0.001 0 1.291 0
200909 201705 0.953 1.603 9.576 -0.001 0 1.282 0
200910 201705 0.855 1.75 9.58 -0.001 0.001 1.246 0
200911 201705 0.699 2.033 9.61 -0.004 0.001 1.196 1
200912 201706 0.532 2.359 9.674 -0.013 0.003 1.152 1
201001 201706 0.333 2.798 9.871 -0.07 0.008 1.085 1
201002 201707 0.147 3.258 10.598 -0.512 0.023 1.007 1
201003 201708 0.024 3.602 17.37 -6.913 0.049 0.955 0
201004 201708 0 3.638 137541.3 -137531 0.055 0.965 0
201005 201708 0 3.611 67216.53 -67206 0.053 0.993 0
201006 201708 0 3.6 94994.89 -94984.4 0.051 1.01 0
201007 201708 0 3.576 309174.8 -309164 0.049 1.047 0
201008 201707 0 3.558 63710.24 -63699.8 0.047 1.079 0
201009 201705 0.077 7.497 11.155 -1.157 0.029 0.406 0
201010 201705 0.065 7.534 11.471 -1.453 0.033 0.384 0
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Figure 2: Top panel: Growth rate of GDP as a function time from 2005 to 2017; bottom
panel: Li Keqiang index as defined in footnote 2. The GDP growth had steadily fallen over
the decade, accompanied by similar downward trends in most sub-sectors. The finance
sector had boomed over a brief period since 2014, followed by a sharp decrease in mid-
2015 due to the stock market crash over that period. See Jiang et al. (2010) for detailed
analysis over the stock market crash. Source: WIND Database
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Figure 3: Top-left panel: Provident Fund Interest Rate as a function of time. Top-right
panel: Stock of New Medium & Long-Term RMB loans to Households (CNY 100mn)
Bottom-left panel: Elasticity of Personal Housing Loan (PHL), Real Estate Development
Loan (RED), and Commercial Real-estate Loan (CRE) relative to GDP. Bottom-right
panel: Proportion of Personal Housing Loan (PHL) over total assets in Big-4 Banks
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